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ABSTRACT 
A natural circulation and integrated layout PWR is here 
proposed by a preliminary feasibility study. Its main features 
are: low unit power and core power density, the same 
temperatures and pressures of current PWRs, no fuel melting 
scenario, passive protection systems, pressure suppression 
containment, long fuel cycle duration and no boron in the 
primary water. The power station can be designed for electrical 
power production (700 MWth - 225 MWe), or for combined 
electricity and heat production (200 MWth); this last solution 
seems viable even for urban siting. Here only the 225 MWe 
plant is described. The reactor startup is obtained by heating 
with a constant and low neutronic power, and a possible 
procedure is indicated and analyzed. The ATWS of a steam line 
break accident in hot standby conditions is studied by a suitable 
calculation program and the results are positive. 
INTRODUCTION 
The nuclear moratorium existing in practical terms in most 
countries of the world has helped us to reconsider the basic 
principles on which nuclear reactors were designed in the past. 
This process, still under way, has implied a certain reversal of 
some of these principles, which can be synthetically defined as: 
i) to increase the unit power, ii) to reduce the design margins, 
iii) to improve the safety by more complex process and 
protection systems. These principles were justified by the main 
goal of the cost reduction, taking into account the need to 
comply with the increasingly stricter safety requirements of the 
licensing Authorities. In practice, this choice resulted 
questionable, a posteriori, because the economy of scale, 
connected to high power ratings, was virtually offset by an 
exaggerated lengthening of the licensing process and the 
construction time, a reduced opportunity of a plant 
standardization and an increased difficulty in plant 
decommissioning. The economic gain of design margin 
reductions was practically reversed by the penalties of a less 
flexible plant operation, and a shortening of the fuel cycle 
duration, both implying a lower load factor, and the need to 
implement more sophisticated, complex and costly safety 
systems. 
This trend is confirmed by the characteristics of the new 
nuclear reactor designs, proposed by different organizations in 
the world. These designs, founded on the already existing 
reactor technologies, have the aim not only of improving their 
inherent and passive behavior with respect of safety, but also of 
reversing the above mentioned principles, so as to render the 
nuclear product more sound from an engineering point of view 
and more palatable to the public opinion. 
A further aspect concerns the need to withstand the severe 
accident scenario, which implies the extended melting of the 
fuel. A lot of studies has been recently carried out on this 
problem, providing a better insight on the overall picture, which 
shows that the consequences of this accident can be 
circumvented by a suitable design. However, the crucial point 
is the hard challenge to experimentally demonstrate the 
correctness of this conclusion by means of a significant test 
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carried out using the irradiated fuel in a realistic plant accident 
scenario. If this is the case, it appears problematic the licensing 
by the Safety Authorities of plants conceived to withstand such 
an accident. Therefore, the best solution seems to be that to 
envisage a reactor design, in which this accident can be 
reasonably excluded by any scenario. 
In conclusion, it appears that a more fruitful approach to 
reactor design is to reverse the above principles and then: i) to 
reduce the unit power, ii) to increase the design margins, and 
iii) to simplify the process and protection systems. This choice 
should also satisfy the cost reduction goal, which in the final 
analysis is the crucial point for any actual application. 
The natural circulation reactor here proposed follows the 
above suggestions. The main features of this reactor concept 
are the following: 
• low unit power; 
• low power density; 
• long fuel cycle duration; 
• no boron poisoning in the primary system but adoption of 
burnable poisons inside the fuel; 
• internal hydraulic driven control rods; 
• no fuel melting scenario; 
• natural circulation of the primary coolant; 
• primary coolant flow outside steam generator tubes (no 
stress corrosion problems); 
• integrated layout including the pressurizer; 
• the same thermodynamic performances of current PWRs 
(pressures and temperatures); 
• pressure suppression containment; 
• simple and passive protection systems. 
Two reactor designs have been conceived: i) a 700 MWth 
(225 MWe) modular reactor to be assembled in several units to 
form a big power station in the same site, ii) a 200 MWth 
reactor to be used for a combined heat and electricity 
production. This last solution can be adopted for urban heating, 
and this use can raise the interest by many countries, also 
because the heat and electricity ratio (approximately 2 to 1) 
satisfies the requirements of an urban use. A similar design of a 
natural circulation reactor for electricity or heat production was 
proposed by argentinean designers, who studied a 100 MWth 
reactor, named CAREM (CAREM, 1991). 
Here only the 225 MWe reactor will be presented. 
REACTOR DESCRIPTION 
The main data of the plant are listed in Table 1, while 
sketches of the reactor vessel, the passive cooling systems and 
the overall layout inside the containment of the NSSS are 
shown in Figs. 1 and 2. 
The maximum inner diameter of the reactor vessel is 
assumed equal to 5 meters, which is well within the fabrication 
limits (for instance South Texas vessel has 5.57 m), and it 
should not imply significant transportation constraints, also 
because the cylindrical portion of the vessel is divided in two 
sections, connected by a flange. The volume power density is 
substantially lower than that of current PWRs: 29 kW/liter 
instead of 105 kW/liter. A previous optimization study 
(Lombardi, Tenconi, 1991) shows that no economic penalty is 
associated to such a reduction in power density, while the 
operational and safety behavior of the overall plant is 
appreciably improved.  
The fuel assembly is of 15x15 type instead of the more 
usual 17x17 one, in order to slightly reduce fuel fabrication 
costs, still obtaining an average linear power density much 
lower than that of  the current 17x17 design (35 %). 
The height over diameter ratio (H/D) of the reactor core is 
chosen in order to reduce to a minimum the overall height of 
the vessel, without yielding a reactivity penalty. The value of 
0.93 adopted in this design is very close to the maximum 
reactivity condition, as it is shown by a parametric study carried 
out by the WIMS program (Askew et al., 1966). The boron 
poisoning of primary coolant is eliminated in order to avoid any 
coolant chemistry concern, to increase the negative moderator 
reactivity coefficient, and above all to avoid in the case of 
power transients any dangerous reactivity insertion due to some 
possible boron stratification. Then the reactivity control is made 
through conventional rods, driven hydraulically inside the 
pressure vessel, as already positively tested in a small Chinese 
PWR (Wang Dazhong, 1993). Burnable poisons (IFBA type: 
Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers) are inserted into the fuel 
rods to reduce the reactivity span of the control rods. The scram 
is obtained by two independent sets of rods, possibly based on 
different activation device, in order to duplicate this safety 
function. 
The fuel cycle length in equilibrium conditions is about 4.5 
years, by assuming an average burnup per cycle of 12 MWd/kg 
and a load factor of 0.80. This long duration has surely positive 
effects on plant load factor. However, the attainment of these 
equilibrium conditions is undoubtedly a lengthy process, which 
can cover a significant portion of the plant life. 
The twelve steam generators, located inside the reactor 
vessel in the peripheral zone, are of the recirculation type. This 
choice is not the final one, because the once-through type is 
still under consideration. The present choice is motivated by the 
need to reduce to a minimum the heat transfer surface; 
moreover the secondary coolant chemistry is made easier, as 
well as the control of the exit conditions. However, two steam 
drums are needed outside the pressure vessel, and this renders 
the overall layout more complex. The primary high pressure 
water flows outside the tubes, thus preventing stress corrosion 
cracking effects and obtaining safety advantages in the case of 
a tube failure. The geometry is the straight tube one, while 
special constructive solutions are to be devised to allow the 
removal of the steam generators for repair or substitution; these 
solutions should be reasonably implemented in this 
arrangement. The same solution is adopted for the twelve Heat 
Removal Exchangers (HRE), located just above the steam 
generators. Two sets of four HREs are directly connected to a 
pool, into which they discharge the hot water and are fed by the 
cold water from the pool bottom by suitable spargers (see Fig 
1). The other two sets of four HREs are connected to an active 
cooling system in order to avoid the pool heat up and to 
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simplify the temperature control of the primary system during 
the start-up operation, the operational transients, any planned 
cooling down operation, and the cold shut-down conditions. 
Each set, both passive and active, is designed to dissipate the 
whole decay heat, so as to obtain a double duplication of this 
safety provision. The material is Inconel 600 for all the 
components. 
The pressurization of the primary coolant is obtained by a 
gas cushion inside the pressure vessel dome. The gas is a 
mixture of saturated steam at the reactor outlet temperature 
(partial pressure 12700 kPa) and nitrogen (partial pressure 2800 
kPa). The pressure control is obtained by a feed of nitrogen and 
a bleed of the gas mixture, while the water level control is 
obtained by a feed and bleed of the primary fluid. The large gas 
volume (25 m3) allows a significant dumping of the pressure 
oscillations during normal operation at constant power. The 
maximum pressure is obtained at the nominal power, while at 
lower power levels it is decreased accordingly with the lower 
reactor outlet temperature allowed by the control system 
through the variation of the secondary steam pressure, without 
varying the nitrogen content in the pressurizer volume. 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
The containment is of the pressure suppression type (see 
Fig. 1). The water pool into which the steam-gas mixture of the 
dry well is discharged during a LOCA, is 15 m high, so as the 
minimum pressure inside the dry well in these conditions never 
goes below two atmospheres absolute (see below for the reason 
of this choice). 
In the case of a steam generators loss as heat sink, the 
decay heat is absorbed by the heat exchangers HRE located 
above the steam generators. The operation of two sets of HREs 
is passive, being activated by opening a valve (passive system 
of fourth class according to IAEA classification). The thermal 
power is dissipated by heating the water contained in two out of 
four compartments of the pool inside the dry well. The pool 
water is brought up to the boiling point (100-120 °C according 
to the dry well pressure) and from this time on the produced 
steam is discharged to the wet well pool through the discharge 
ducts. The pool water can last several hours and can be 
replaced from an external reservoir through charging pumps. 
In the case of LOCAs, owed to a pressure vessel breach or 
a failure of the servicing tubes connected to the vessel, or a 
steam generator tube rupture, the water level inside the vessel 
remains always well above the reactor core, by adopting a 
suitable out of vessel geometry in the lower dry-well zone (see 
Fig 1). The steam generated by the decay power is condensed 
in the passive heat exchangers and recycled into the reactor. 
The minimum absolute pressure of two atmospheres in the dry-
well helps the condensation process. Even in the unforeseeable 
complete loss of water inside the vessel and the dry-well, the 
natural circulation of the remaining steam-air mixture through 
the core and the passive heat exchangers is capable to keep the 
fuel temperature below the melting point. However, this 
situation is beyond any conceivable hypothesis, because of the 
geometry of the dry-well lower zone and because further water 
is drained by gravity from the water pool located inside the dry-
well, via check valves. 
In the case of a steam generator tube rupture, the steam line 
geometry is such to avoid any siphon effect, which might yield 
a partial voidage of the vessel, if the secondary circuit remains 
open toward the discharge lines. 
PLANT START UP 
The reactor heating during start-up is obtained by nuclear 
power. This is a significant difference to current PWRs. In the 
initial cold conditions, the water level is realized by a nitrogen 
cushion brought to its nominal pressure (2800 kPa). Then the 
control rods are raised till a small positive reactivity value is 
obtained. The reactor power starts going up and the water 
inside the core is heated up: a slow natural circulation is 
initiated, thus spreading the water heating within the whole 
vessel. The reactor power is stopped at a very low value: in the 
present example about 17 MW. From this time on the reactivity 
is brought to zero and this value is kept constant. The cold sink 
is made by the two active sets of the HREs, activated when the 
reactivity is brought to zero; their inlet temperature is 
controlled in such a way to keep them always few degrees 
below the inlet primary temperature. Under these conditions the 
reactor power is higher than that extracted by the HREs, and 
the reactor is progressively heated up. Anyway, the reactivity 
negative temperature feedback involves a progressive control 
rod extraction, in order to keep a null reactivity value. The 
liquid level raises, due to the thermal expansion, and then the 
primary water is continuously bled. The steam partial pressure 
raises as well, and accordingly the overall pressure increases up 
to the maximum nominal value. This procedure assures that the 
heat up process occurs keeping limited the reactor power, so as 
to remain within the capabilities of the HREs, to slow down the 
dynamics of the operation and to reduce the wasted energy. 
Once the primary temperatures approach the nominal value, the 
steam generators are put in operation and the HREs are 
disconnected. Finally, the reactor power is progressively raised 
to the nominal value by acting on the control rods. 
The above procedure was analyzed by means of the TRAP 
code (Brega et al., 1996) and the results of the transient lasting 
34000 seconds are reported in Fig. 3. 
SAFETY TRANSIENTS 
The most crucial safety transient seems to be the steam line 
rupture. In principle, the lowering of the inlet core coolant 
temperature connected to the high negative reactivity 
coefficient of the moderator temperature might imply a 
significant reactivity insertion, before the neutronic power is 
transformed into thermal power, so as to reverse the downward 
trend of the coolant temperature. However, the small coolant 
speed along the downcomer and inside the core delays 
substantially this transient. As a matter of fact this speed is very 
low in hot standby conditions, which usually results the worst 
initial conditions for this accident. 
The accident was studied in ATWS conditions, in order to 
verify its acceptability in these severe scenario. The transient 
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was analyzed by the above mentioned TRAP program. The 
main initial conditions are: 1.5 MWth, - 60 pcm/°C, 289 °C. 
The main resulting parameters are displayed in Fig. 4 versus 
time, i.e.: break flow rate, steam drum pressure, total reactivity, 
thermal and neutronic power, core flowrate and maximum fuel 
temperature. The break in the common steam line is such to 
increase stepwise the steam flow rate from almost zero to 150% 
of the nominal value. The steam drum pressure first goes down 
rapidly, then it remains almost constant, because of the 
contribution of the reactor power producing new steam in the 
steam generator, and finally goes down steeply to zero, when 
the reactor power decreases. The break flow rate follows 
practically the same trend, while the reactor flow rate rises 
rapidly to a maximum slightly higher than the nominal value, 
then goes down to zero in a rather regular way. The reactivity 
has a very narrow peak of 600 pcm, which is translated in an 
analogous peak in the neutronic power of 1550 MW. The 
thermal power peak is substantially reduced and widened, so 
that the maximum value is only slightly higher than the 
nominal value (880 against 700 MW). In spite of this, the 
maximum fuel temperature is slightly lower than the nominal 
value (730 against 775 °C), because of its thermal inertia. The 
transient was repeated for different maximum values of the 
break flow rate: the results show a roughly constant value of the 
reactivity peak around 600 pcm, thus suggesting that this 
parameter is intrinsically limited by the doppler effect and the 
feedback of the thermal power on the core coolant temperature. 
In conclusion, it seems that the consequences of this severe 
accident are really limited, notwithstanding the conservative 
hypothesis adopted. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The natural circulation integrated layout PWR seems to 
satisfy the criteria to avoid any severe consequences in the case 
of postulated accidents. This conclusion is to be verified in a 
more thorough way by an enlarged parametric study. The main 
uncertainties concern the steam generator mechanical design, 
the choice between recirculation and once-through steam 
generator, and the overall layout including the design and 
verification of the containment. This will be analyzed in the 
next future. 
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Table 1. Main Plant Data 
Core 
  
 Thermal power 700 MW 
 Electrical power 225 MW 
 Pressure 15.5 MPa 
 Inlet/Outlet temperatures 289/329 °C 
 Flow Rate (bypass excl.) 3017 kg/s 
 Bypass flow rate fraction 0.06 
 Equivalent diameter 3.22 m 
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 Inner/Outer barrel diameter 3.49/3.57 m 
 Height (total/active) 3.4/3 m 
 Fuel assemblies (15x15) 177 
 Fuel rods per assembly 204 
 Rod diameter (outer/pellet) 10.72/9.29 mm 
 Cladding thickness 0.62 mm 
 Pitch 14.27 mm 
 Assembly equivalent diameter 13.57 mm 
 Overall assembly width 214 mm 
 Fuel weight 77100 kg 
 Volume power density 28.65 kW/l 
 Average fuel linear power density 6.28 kW/m 
 Moderator power fraction 0.03 
Vessel 
  
 Inner diameter (upper/lower) 5.0/4.0 m 
 Total height 24.20 m 
 Cylinder thickness (upper/lower) 0.26/0.20 m 
 Overall friction pressure losses 8.33 kPa 
 Overall volume 362.5 m3 
Steam Generators 
  
 Number  12 
 Tube diameter (outer/inner) 10/8.8 mm 
 Pitch 14 mm 
 Equivalent diameter 14.95 mm 
 Tube height 3.82 m 
 Total number of tubes 49092 
 Total HT surface 5891 m2 
 Steam drum number 2 
 Steam drum (diameter/length) 2.5/6 m 
 Steam drum pressure 6.2 MPa 
Passive Heat Removal Exchangers 
  
 Number 12 
 Tube diameter (outer/inner) 10/8.8 mm 
 Pitch 14 mm 
 Equivalent diameter 14.95 mm 
 Tube height 1.60 m 
 Total number of tubes 49092 
 Total HT surface 2466 m2 
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Figure 1. Layout of the Nuclear Steam Supply System: integrated pressure vessel with connected 
safety circuits. 
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Figure 2. Layout of the Nuclear Steam Supply System: longitudinal section of the vessel and plant 
views at different elevations. 
 8 Copyright © 1996 by ASME 
0 20000 40000
time [s]
2000
4000
[k
g/
s]
CORE FLOW RATE
.
Nominal value
 
0 20000 40000
time [s]
100
200
300
[°
C
]
CORE FLUID TEMP.
.
Outlet
Inlet
Nominal values
 
 
0 20000 40000
time [s]
0
250
500
750
[M
W
]
POWER
Core
HRE / SG
.
Nominal value
 
0 20000 40000
time [s]
0
10
20
[M
W
]
HEATING POWER
(generated - extracted) 
.
 
 
Figure 3. Typical Start up transient of the plant. 
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Figure 4. ATWS Steam Line Break accident in hot standby conditions. 
